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he  root  of  the  problem in  Cyprus  is  well  known.  Its  two  major banks had 
attracted  huge  deposits  from  abroad, largely  from  Russia,  and  presumably 
mostly from individuals wanting to escape  scrutiny at home. The proceeds 
were then invested in Greek government bonds and loans to Greek companies. When 
Greece imploded, these investments went sour and the banks in Cyprus that had 
engaged in this strategy were insolvent. Given this situation, the logical choice for the 
country  should  have  been  clear:  if  the  government  wanted  to  survive,  foreign 
depositors must bear part of the losses. It is thus difficult to understand why the 
government of Cyprus was at first so reluctant to inflict any losses on depositors. 
However, the solution that was eventually agreed makes sense: the two largest banks 
of the country are effectively resolved. Their bad assets will be separated and wound 
down over time. Neither the government of Cyprus nor the European taxpayer will 
put any additional funds in these banks. The losses that remain once the bad assets 
have been disposed of will thus have to be borne by the creditors of the bank, which 
in this case means those with deposits of over €100,000. 
Although Cyprus is too small to matter for global financial markets, its case could 
turn out to become a very important precedent for the way European policy-makers 
deal with future banking problems and the plans for a ‘banking union’. 
A banking union needs three elements: a single supervisor, a common resolution 
authority and a credible system of deposit insurance. There are lessons on all three 
accounts: 
The need for a single supervisor that has not been captured by local interests has 
been once more underlined. The ECB would never have allowed the banks in Cyprus 
to attract huge deposits by paying above-market interest rates and then to put all of 
their eggs in one basket (Greece). This was a high-risk strategy without a safety net. 
There is still some discussion about how to create a common resolution authority. 
But events have shown that the ECB has become de facto the resolution authority for 
the banks in the euro area because a bank in difficulties cannot survive if the ECB 
does not grant or renew emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). This accumulation of 
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power in the hands of a completely independent institution is of course not ideal 
from the point of view of democratic accountability. But this should constitute an 
additional  incentive  for  member  states  to  agree  to  the  creation  of  real  common 
resolution authority with enough funding to be able to resolve in an orderly way 
even larger banks. 
The revolt of the small savers in Cyprus has also underlined the need for a credible 
system  of  deposit  insurance.  The  European  Directive  that  establishes  that  bank 
deposits have to be protected up to €100,000 does not provide a European guarantee 
as it imposes only an obligation upon member states to create a deposit insurance 
system at the national level. In reality, however, the impression has been created that 
somehow ‘Europe’ protects small depositors. Until now plans for a common deposit 
insurance system have not been even on the table because deposit insurance was not 
perceived as a live problem. Cyprus has shattered this complacency. Leaving deposit 
insurance exclusively at the national level is no longer an option. 
But Cyprus holds also a more general lesson: Given the extreme reaction of financial 
markets to the bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman in 2008, it had become 
an axiom among policy-makers in Europe that no bank should be allowed to become 
insolvent. But financial markets did not react negatively to the news that for the first 
time even depositors in a bank in the EU will lose part of their money. This was 
noted with glee in Berlin and elsewhere in Northern Europe. 
The key lesson for European policy-makers is thus that it is possible to ‘bail in’ the 
creditors of a bank. This has not been officially admitted, but it was expressed quite 
clearly by the President of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who said that after 
Cyprus, Europe should become more courageous in bailing in bank creditors. 
This realisation that the European taxpayer does not have to save every troubled 
bank might have a very beneficial effect: the German resistance to Banking Union is 
motivated  by  the  fear  that  this  would  mean  that  the  German  taxpayer  would 
indirectly have to underwrite the losses of banks in the euro area periphery. 
Cyprus represents of course an extreme and special case on many accounts. But the 
way the problem arose and the solution that was finally adopted might have very 
important consequences for the way Europe deals with its banking problems.  
 